

SECURITY INFORMATION

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DATE: 15 April 1952

TO : Chief, SR
Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AERODYNAMIC

SPECIFIC— Transmittal of Progress Report for AERODYNAMIC Project

Transmitted herewith is the Progress Report for the AERODYNAMIC Project for the period 1 March through 15 April 1952.

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
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Subject: REDSOX/AERODYNAMIC Progress Report 1 March to 15 April 1952

1. Introduction: The entire period up to 3 April was characterized by intensified preparations for an early April dispatch. Everyone concerned with the project at CSOB/K worked steadily day and night to make the early dispatch plan a reality and it came as a definite shock to all the American and CASSOWARY personnel, that, after it had been proven to the CARTHAGES that above-ground survival in the snow was possible with proper equipment, the key members of the team refused point blank to go in before 20 April. Since 3 April, training has continued at the same pace and the freight and equipment has been re-shuffled with an eye to eliminating the extra freight pack entirely. We have tentatively decided to dispatch all five CARTHAGES with rucksacks containing 60 to 65 pounds of equipment apiece. The logic of eliminating the extra cargo and chute and our preference for a five instead of a four man team are explained below. As of 15 April, no reply has been received from Headquarters to KAUF-888. A final decision on which moon period we will use, May or June, is therefore still in abeyance. Our reasons for wishing to wait until June still apply and have been supplemented by those of the Air Support Section (See FRANF-2114).

2. Calendar of Events: Since the present report covers an abnormally long period, a brief chronological account of happenings will aid Headquarters in reconstructing exactly what has happened. For additional information on training see the schedules that have been forwarded to Headquarters.

3 March

All the CARTHAGES witnessed a practice night parachute jump to a reception committee involving the URC-4 homing beacon, the ejection of freight bundles and two live night jumps by 

3-15 March.

Parachute training for CARTHAGES 15 and 16 and refresher course for CARTHAGES 10 and 12. CARTHAGE 13 was sick with tonsillitis during this period.

12 March

CARTHAGE 13 taken to hospital for tonsilectomy.

12 March

CASSOWARIES 3 and 4 agree to our using CARTHAGE 3 as an assistant trainer for CARTHAGES 15 and 16, so that latter can learn useful subjects while 10, 12 and 13 are doing radio work.

13-25 March

CARTHAGE 3 trains new men on situation in Ukraine, partisan tactics, security, etc.

14 March

CARTHAGE 13 has his tonsils removed.

CARTHAGE 13 returns from the hospital

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21-24 March

CARTHAGES 10, 12, 15 and 16, accompanied by CASSOWARY 6,  camped in wooded mountain terrain in order to test:

- i. The team's ability to survive in the snow;
- ii. How much concentrated and other foods the team needs per day;
- iii. The new CARTHAGE's aptitude to rough partisan life;
- iv. The ability of the team to handle freight and move about in heavy snow;
- v. The suitability of each item of equipment.

(The results of this field test will be pouched in detail soon.)

25 March

CARTHAGE 3 is separated from the team because CARTHAGES 10, 12 and 13 show resentment to his presence by sarcastic comments.

26 March

CASSOWARIES 3, 4 and 6 along with Donald A. Gallo discuss the early dispatch plan with all CARTHAGES. CARTHAGE 13 states flatly he will not go in until the snow is off the ground. (For a fuller account see Para 7 below.)

27 March

Austrian and Czech documents for all members of the team arrived in CSOB/K.

31 March

CASSOWARY 6 arrives at CSOB/K to live with the team and participate in their training.

1 April

CASSOWARIES 3 and 4 conferring with Shands and Pendleton agreed on the following:

- i. The DZ selected is highly suitable;
- ii. Extensive briefing given CASSOWARY 5 in 1951 plus limited mental capacity of all members of this year's team, plus security factor dictate minimal verbal briefing primarily on operational matters this year.
- iii. If a four-man team is sent, CARTHAGE 15 will remain in Germany for W/T training.

1 April

Large freight bundle is packed

2 April

All CARTHAGES plus CASSOWARY 6 taken for a ride in a C-82 to give jumpmaster a chance to push bundles out and team a chance to see 36 American airborne troops bail out.


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3 April

CARTHAGES 10, 12 and 13 refuse to be dispatched before May moon period, although they can offer no compelling reason why they should not go in before 14 April.

1-8 April

All CARTHAGES have dental work done on the German economy.

3. Training: (See Training Schedules forwarded to Washington regularly under separate cover.)

On 10 April the CARTHAGES took a 30 kilometer hike with [] [] This was in addition to their regular gymnasium P/T work. The hike included a map problem. The CARTHAGES have requested more such hikes to toughen them up. More are planned.

On 11 April [] [] gave the CARTHAGES several hours of technical instruction concerned with the proper operation of the SR-1 receiver of the URC-4 battery, the repair and maintenance of the set, etc.

The CARTHAGES were able to understand every word, since [] [] talked to them in their native language. They have requested more lectures and practical instruction on Commo from [] []

4. Morale: See comments under Special Problems below.

5. Personnel: As stated in Para 1 above we would like to send in a team of five men this year instead of the usual four. Our reasons are concisely as follows:

a. Judging from our past experience there is roughly one-out-of-three chances that a man will get hurt on the drop;

b. This year's DZ is isolated but rugged;

c. If only three men or less are in good physical shape after landing, splitting into two two-man teams, should the situation require it, would be impossible;

d. The present CARTHAGE team is composed of two pairs of bosom buddies (CARTHAGE 10-12 and CARTHAGE 15-16) and CARTHAGE 13 who is the only man who knows how to get contact with CAWNPORE;

e. Should one of the buddies be deleted, his pal might drop out or be unnerved to the extent that he would not perform well;

f. CARTHAGE 13 is the cornerstone and cannot be removed;

g. If any one were retained in Germany, CASSOWARY 15 would be the unanimous choice since he is anxious for training, his W/T aptitude (which 16 does not), and is least essential to the group (CARTHAGE 16 is stronger,

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younger and therefore comparatively a better packhorse.);

h. The disadvantages to retaining CARTHAGE 16 would be:

i. He looks insignificant and has a marked inferiority complex coupled with an emotional nature, and a good dose of infantile negativism which causes him to drop out of competition and sulk if he is picked on too much;

ii. If a new team were built around him the new men would be singularly unimpressed by this caliber of man;

iii. He languishes if left alone and it possibility exists that would rapidly turn into a morale problem if we were not able to recruit new team members almost immediately;

iv. He has an estranged wife (who was unfaithful to him) but who is trying to locate him for financial support;

v. He wants to go with the present group and is psychologically prepared to do so;

i. By sending all five men we will have no leftovers so that we can start with a clean slate and the next team will not come to know about all dispatches to date;

j. If an entirely new team is recruited CARTHAGE 3 could conceivably be used as assistant instructor and reside with the team; he is not at all known in the emigration and his past misbehavior, if it can be termed that, would not be known to the new team;

k. If five men are sent now we can probably eliminate the extra freight pack altogether and thereby save a lot of time and effort for the team which would otherwise (we know from experience) have to stay in the vicinity of the DZ to locate the extra bundle in the dark, dismantle it, bury roughly 50 or more pounds of non-essential bulky equipment (parachute, harnesses, outer wrappings of the bundle, padding, boxes, etc.)

CARTHAGE 3: Since 25 March when he was finally and abruptly separated from the others, CARTHAGE 3 has been living in a safehouse alone in another town. [] talks to him in the evenings on the average of three times a week. His future disposition is still undecided. It will probably be expedient for us to continue to use this man as an assistant instructor for a brand new team none of the members of which know him. He claims he still wants to work for the cause and would be willing to go in on another round-trip mission if it develops that he is the only man left abroad who knows how to get local contact with CAWNPORE. Since last summer, however, he has fallen in love with a Bavarian waitress, ten years his junior, and wants to marry her. We do not know whether it has reached the stage yet where he has to marry her. We have explained that marriage will probably adversely influence his chances for immigration and that he cannot

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marry before a security clearance has been successfully performed on his intended. We have urged that CASSOWARY 3 have a father-son discussion with CARTHAGE 3 soonest. As far as work is concerned, CARTHAGE 3 has worked steadily on his English. He has done a few odd jobs such as coloring in black and white map photographs for the next dispatch team. He has also requested any and all work that we can give him. We have assigned him the job of writing textbook treaties on partisan activities such as burial and camouflage, courier work, etc.

6. Administration: The accounting regulations for money disbursed to or by agents have caused several morale complications. The CARTHAGES are not used to accounting for money systematically and any insistence on exactitude by the case officers is interpreted as "materialism", love of the all-mighty dollar, stinginess, etc. Since the impressions this team will carry with it will influence what CAWNPORE thinks of us, the undersigned have recently endeavored to eliminate insofar as possible signed receipts and accounting by the CARTHAGES themselves. CASSOWARY 6 now acts somewhat as a cutout on financial matters and this is all as it should be.

7. Special problems:

a. Briefing: Since we know that CASSOWARY 5 did reach CAWNPORE Headquarters in 1951, we see little sense in repeating any of the intelligence and political briefing given him. We have, however, stressed document intelligence with particular emphasis on the procurement of originals and photographs of originals. As far as political briefing is concerned, we have a team with no real grasp of politics. Both CASSOWARY 10 and 12 have aired political opinions which are quite unfavorable to the U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis their native land. Thus to counteract whatever genuine or half-baked political opinions they have picked up from reading emigre papers, we propose to give them no verbal political briefing at all so that they will not be taken to be knowledgeable or reliable political commentators by CAWNPORE. In addition, CASSOWARY 3 will transmit whatever political briefing he chooses to send in writing, sticking closely to those matters about which the Soviet Government already knows. We do not have a CASSOWARY 5, CARTHAGE 3 or CARTHAGE 8 on this team: except in matters of tradecraft these boys think with their emotions. These emotions qualify them for extreme self-sacrifice and patriotic action but not for analysis of intellectual theories or for logical exposition. In brief, the main briefing for this team will have to be limited mainly to operational matters such as post-landing procedures, their duty to report everything they observe by W/T, their duty to obey instructions from the CASSOWARIES or us until such time as they are subordinated either to CASSOWARY 5, CAWNPORE 6 or either one's successor, etc. We are only assigning duties to this CARTHAGE team which we believe it capable of accomplishing.

b. The Meeting of 26 March:

On 26 March CASSOWARY 3, 4 and 6 met with the CARTHAGES and tried by every means short of a direct order to get the team's consent for an early dispatch. All three CASSOWARIES were thoroughly convinced of the soundness of the plan and wasted no words in coming to the point. ☐ sat in on this


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entire meeting and is witness to the fact that the CASSOWARIES pulled no punches and said everything that was possible to say without losing the team's loyalty. The team admitted that survival in the snow for a month was perfectly feasible as far as food and equipment was concerned. They insisted, however, that if they were observed while parachuting earthward, or while on the ground, their chances of surviving subsequent enemy action would be practically nil since their tracks left in the snow would be easily spotted and followed. Several of the arguments they used were exaggerated and illogical. At one point CASSOWARY 3, who was white as a sheet with anger, at the unreasoning stubbornness of the men, blurted out: "Boys, no matter what time of year we send you in we cannot make you into invisible men: there will be some risk and danger involved. You must remember that your comrades there face danger every day. You must think of them and how much it means to our whole movement to have contact with the outside world." Before the conclusion of the meeting each CARTHAGE expressed his willingness to go in as soon as the snow was off the ground. The new men, CARTHAGES 15 and 16, participated in the discussions only as listeners, but they expressed their willingness to go in any time the other CARTHAGES wanted to. CARTHAGE 13 spoke up again and said that he was certain that he would be "master of the situation" and capable of getting into contact with CAWNPORE.

It was decided to wait a week before approaching the team again, re dispatch date. Both the CASSOWARIES and the case officers hoped for warmer, summer weather, but as luck would have it, snow fell heavily on 1 and 2 April and the weather continued cloudy and inclement. Nevertheless on 3 April the team was approached again by the CASSOWARIES but refused to go in prior to 20 April, the earliest date when contact with local CAWNPORE elements was deemed feasible by CARTHAGE 13. The team was told by CASSOWARY 3 that moon and weather conditions did not permit any April drops after the 14th. In addition the ^May moon period has been used too often to be re-used with impunity this year. These simple, matter-of-fact arguments did not change CARTHAGE 10, 12 and 13's minds. In essence, "snow is snow and we are afraid of it.", was their only argument and they stuck tenaciously to it. CASSOWARY 3 was reluctant to order them to go in against their will because he felt that they would not be in the proper psychological frame of mind for such a mission and therefore would not perform well. Never before in this operation has there been any substantial difference of opinion between CASSOWARIES and CARTHAGES on the subject of dispatch dates. It should be remembered, however, every former CARTHAGE we have had has been vehemently against going in while there is snow on the ground, although this year they were for a time in favor of the idea. CARTHAGE 3 argued in favor of the snow drop, but he was not a member of the team and the CARTHAGES 13, 12 and 10 did not love him any more for what they considered meddling in their affairs. As CARTHAGE 13 put it, "If CARTHAGE 3 wants to go in and live in the snow, let him, but I know more about the dangers of living in the snow than he does and I will not go in until the snow has melted even if CASSOWARY 1 orders me to go. I'll just tell them they can shoot me for disobedience, but I won't go."


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d. The Sessions 4-5 April:

On 4 April in the morning it was agreed by the case officers and the Chief of CSOB/K that with the two refusals of the team we would possibly be faced by a third, repeat performance. CASSOWARY 6 who was around CSOB/K at the time and in a highly indignant and disgusted frame of mind because of the teams stubbornness and malingering, offered to have a knock-down-drag-out session on the morning of 5 April with the team. In the presence of [] CASSOWARY 6 proposed that the team was making one-sided and over-hasty decisions before having even listened to the arguments on the other side. At this session each man was asked point blank to guarantee once and for all, no ifs ands or buts, his readiness to go in anytime after 20 April. All guaranteed unconditionally that they would go in anytime after 20 April.

The spontaneous initiative of CASSOWARY 6 in these matters is commendable. For the first time in almost four years CASSOWARY 6 criticized CASSOWARY 3 and 4 privately in our presence. He argued that many of the flaps and morale problems of the team would have been avoided had CASSOWARYS 3 and 4 given more of their time to the team.

e. The Reactions:

CASSOWARY 6 was also upset by the fact that the team had not received proper attention from CASSOWARY 3 and 4 who pay only very occasional visits to the team usually lasting only a few hours. All the CASSOWARIES have been very contrite about admitting this error and admit that it is possible that things would have gone differently had a CASSOWARY man been in constant attendance. Certainly a few minor crises endemic in the training of all teams could have been nipped in the bud, but it is senseless to speculate whether or not anything could have overcome the age-old partisan snow and cold weather phobias.

For many individuals on both sides of the Atlantic who have given their time and energies feverishly preparing for the pre-May AERODYNAMIC dispatch one question must arise to which no answer is so far on file: Why did the case officers in Southern Germany wait so long before establishing with finality whether the team actually consented to go in before May? Since many of the local factors predicated the conferences of 26 March and 3 April have not been written up, the following outline will serve to reconstruct the thinking of the CASSOWARIES and the undersigned, from mid-February to 3 April. It should be obvious to the reader that the delay in getting the team's final decision was the unavoidable result of the basic nature of this operation and the geographic location of the approving authorities both Ukrainian and American: In brief, until Headquarters, CASSOWARY 2 in New York, the CASSOWARIES and Shands in Munich plus the pertinent personnel at CSOB/K had approved the pre-thaw dispatch plan in principle, the team could not be queried. Here are the main interdependent steps and factors involved:

a. The pre-May dispatch plan was not conceived until mid-February;

b. Washington did not give tentative approval until 28 February without which both the case officers and CASSOWARIES were unwilling to query the

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c. CASSOWARY 3 was not in a position to instruct the team on the plan without the concurrence of CASSOWARY 2 which did not arrive until 20 March;

d. When the plan was originally discussed informally with the CARTHAGES they voiced doubt as to their ability to take in sufficient and proper equipment to survive in the snow until late April, therefore;

e. It was ^{agreed} by the CASSOWARIES and case officers that the team would either refuse to go in or not be properly equipped either psychologically or materially until a successful camping trip proved the equipment and overcame their fear of snow;

f. The successful camping trip took place on 21-24 March and could not have taken place any sooner because the Air Force survival equipment needed for the trip had not arrived and CARTHAGE 13, the key man had not recovered from his tonsilectomy of 14 March;

g. Since CARTHAGE 13 had been the ringleader of the anti-snow contingent he had to participate in at least part of the snow camping problem (as it was he was only in camp the last day because of his tonsilectomy.);

h. As soon as the CARTHAGES had rested up from their camping trip, the question was put squarely to them on 26 March.

We gambled on the pre-May dispatch plan and although we lost the bet we gained valuable time for further training, planning and perfecting equipment and procedures, which we believe to be a great advantage.

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